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In this paper, a signature-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is developed to detect cyber intrusions of a distribution system with a high level penetration of solar energy. To identify cyberattack events, an attack table is constructed based on the Temporal Failure Propagation Graph (TFPG) technique. It includes the information of potential cyberattack patterns in terms of attack types and time sequence of anomaly events. Once the detected anomaly events are matched with any of the predefined attack patterns, it is judged to be a cyberattack. Since the attack patterns are distinguishable from other system failures, it reduces the false positive rate. To study the impact of cyberattacks on solar devices and validate the performance of the proposed IDS, a realistic Cyber-Physical System (CPS) simulation environment available at Virginia Tech (VT) is used to develop an interconnection between the cyber and power system models. The CPS model demonstrates how communication system anomalies can impact the physical system. The results of two example cyberattack test cases are obtained with the IEEE 13 node test feeder system and the power system simulator, DIgSILENT PowerFactory. 

The fast-growing installation of solar PVs has a significant impact on the operation of distribution systems. Grid-tied solar inverters provide reactive power capability to support the voltage profile in a distribution system. In comparison with traditional inverters, smart inverters have the capability of real time remote control through digital communication interfaces. However, cyberattack has become a major threat with the deployment of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) in a smart grid. The past cyberattack incidents have demonstrated how attackers can sabotage a power grid through digital communication systems. In the worst case, numerous electricity consumers can experience a major and extended power outage. Unfortunately, tracking techniques are not efficient for today’s advanced communication networks. Therefore, a reliable cyber protection system is a necessary defense tool for the power grid. In this paper, a signature-based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is developed to detect cyber intrusions of a distribution system with a high level penetration of solar energy. To identify cyberattack events, an attack table is constructed based on the Temporal Failure Propagation Graph (TFPG) technique. It includes the information of potential cyberattack patterns in terms of attack types and time sequence of anomaly events. Once the detected anomaly events are matched with any of the predefined attack patterns, it is judged to be a cyberattack. Since the attack patterns are distinguishable from other system failures, it reduces the false positive rate. To study the impact of cyberattacks on solar devices and validate the performance of the proposed IDS, a realistic Cyber-Physical System (CPS) simulation environment available at Virginia Tech (VT) is used to develop an interconnection between the cyber and power system models. The CPS model demonstrates how communication system anomalies can impact the physical system. The results of two example cyberattack test cases are obtained with the IEEE 13 node test feeder system and the power system simulator, DIgSILENT PowerFactory. 

Abstract Despite the f₀(980) hadron having been discovered half a century ago, the question about its quark content has not been settled: it might be an ordinary quark-antiquark ($${{\rm{q}}}\overline{{{\rm{q}}}}$$ $q\overline{q}$) meson, a tetraquark ($${{\rm{q}}}\overline{{{\rm{q}}}}{{\rm{q}}}\overline{{{\rm{q}}}}$$ $q\overline{q}q\overline{q}$) exotic state, a kaon-antikaon ($${{\rm{K}}}\overline{{{\rm{K}}}}$$ $K\overline{K}$) molecule, or a quark-antiquark-gluon ($${{\rm{q}}}\overline{{{\rm{q}}}}{{\rm{g}}}$$ $q\overline{q}g$) hybrid. This paper reports strong evidence that the f₀(980) state is an ordinary$${{\rm{q}}}\overline{{{\rm{q}}}}$$ $q\overline{q}$meson, inferred from the scaling of elliptic anisotropies (v₂) with the number of constituent quarks (n_q), as empirically established using conventional hadrons in relativistic heavy ion collisions. The f₀(980) state is reconstructed via its dominant decay channel f₀(980) →π⁺π⁻, in proton-lead collisions recorded by the CMS experiment at the LHC, and itsv₂is measured as a function of transverse momentum (p_T). It is found that then_q= 2 ($${{\rm{q}}}\overline{{{\rm{q}}}}$$ $q\overline{q}$state) hypothesis is favored overn_q= 4 ($${{\rm{q}}}\overline{{{\rm{q}}}}{{\rm{q}}}\overline{{{\rm{q}}}}$$ $q\overline{q}q\overline{q}$or$${{\rm{K}}}\overline{{{\rm{K}}}}$$ $K\overline{K}$states) by 7.7, 6.3, or 3.1 standard deviations in thep_T< 10, 8, or 6 GeV/cranges, respectively, and overn_q= 3 ($${{\rm{q}}}\overline{{{\rm{q}}}}{{\rm{g}}}$$ $q\overline{q}g$hybrid state) by 3.5 standard deviations in thep_T< 8 GeV/crange. This result represents the first determination of the quark content of the f₀(980) state, made possible by using a novel approach, and paves the way for similar studies of other exotic hadron candidates. 

A first search for beyond the standard model physics in jet multiplicity patterns of multilepton events is presented, using a data sample corresponding to an integrated luminosity of $138{\mathrm{fb}}^{-1}$of 13 TeV proton-proton collisions recorded by the CMS detector at the LHC. The search uses observed jet multiplicity distributions in one-, two-, and four-lepton events to explore possible enhancements in jet production rate in three-lepton events with and without bottom quarks. The data are found to be consistent with the standard model expectation. The results are interpreted in terms of supersymmetric production of electroweak chargino-neutralino superpartners with cascade decays terminating in prompt hadronic $R$-parity violating interactions.